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IS THERE A FUTURE FOR TORT?
John G. Fleming*
Wex Malone stands high on the pyramid of tort scholars. His fascina-
tion with the subtleties of the judicial process has yielded a rich harvest
of insights into the operation of tort law, which has made all of us his
epigones. Yet his dedication to tort law has not clouded his vision to
the significance of alternative systems of accident compensation. Workers'
compensation has been a life long foil. It is therefore fitting to make
my salutation to him by once more reviewing the credentials of tort law
against its competitors in the light of contemporary accident compensa-
tion policies.
Our legal experience has long made us aware that there are several,
rather than one, possible solutions to the problem of compensating acci-
dent victims. They range from "letting the loss lie where it falls" to pro-
viding compensation for all casualties. In between, the law of torts oc-
cupies a half-way, and increasingly half-hearted, position. Indeed, so rich
is our experience that we have come to live with all of these different
regimes at one and the same time.
This, however, is a very modern, and probably transitional, develop-
ment. Until towards the end of the nineteenth century, the law of torts
offered the only means of compensation from outside sources, aside from
charity. Even then, its offerings were penurious. Both the law and the
social context in which it operated saw to that. Duties of care for the
sake of public safety were kept under stringent control (e.g., occupiers'
liability) or altogether denied (e.g., manufacturers' liability). The defenses
of voluntary assumption of risk and contributory negligence denied
recovery even to victims of proven negligence and virtually precluded all
tort claims for work injuries. In addition, high social, informational, and
economic obstacles obstructed "access to justice" for the largest propor-
tion of the population. If, as the Pearson Commission tells us, only 6.5%
of accident injuries in England nowadays attract any tort damages,' one
can imagine the negligible role played by the tort system one hundred
years earlier.2
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1. 1 ROYAL COMMISSION ON CIVIL LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY,
REPORT 78 (1978) [hereinafter cited as PEARSON COMM'N].
2. This is not the place for entering upon the controversy of whether this state of
affairs was the product, at least in America, of a deliberate judicial strategy to "subsidize"
the contemporary economic power structure at the expense of public safety, as argued by
scholars of the self-styled "Critical Legal Studies" circle. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY
OF AMERICAN LAW (1973); M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860,
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If this meant that in practice few accidents were compensated, such
a calamity was at the time hardly viewed as a criticism of tort law. Thus,
in 1881 Oliver Wendell Holmes in his The Common Law staunchly
defended the fault system even more for its incentive to enterprise than
for its incentive to care:
As action cannot be avoided, and tends to the public good, there
is obviously no policy in throwing the hazard of what is at once
desirable and inevitable upon the actor.
The state might conceivably make itself a mutual insurance com-
pany against accidents, and distribute the burden of its citizens'
mishaps among all its members. There might be a pension for
paralytics, and state aid for those who suffer in person or estate
from tempest or wild beasts. . . . The State does none of these
things, however, and the prevailing view is that its cumbrous and
expensive machinery ought not to be set in motion unless some
clear benefit is to be derived from disturbing the status quo. State
interference is an evil, where it cannot be shown to be a good.
Universal insurance, if desired, can be better and more cheaply
accomplished by private enterprise.3
The birth of a state-sponsored insurance scheme, foreshadowed by these
remarks, in fact had to wait only two more years for the passage in 1883
of Bismarck's first workers' compensation act. A prophecy of what this
newcomer portended for the future of compensation policy, and tort law
in particular, was ventured in a classic article in the Harvard Law Review
by Professor Jeremiah Smith in 1913, three years after the enactment of
the first comprehensive American workers' compensation statute.
[I]t seems safe to say that the basic principles of [workmen's com-
pensation legislation and of the common law around a.d. 1900]
are irreconcilable. They cannot both be wholly right, or both
wholly wrong.4 The public are not likely to be "content for long
under these contradictory systems." In the end, one or the other
of the two conflicting theories is likely to prevail. There is no
probability, during the present generation, of a repeal of the
Workmen's Compensation Acts. Indeed, the tendency is now in
the direction of extension, rather than repeal, of this species of
legislation. The only present available method to remove the in-
consistency is by bringing about a change in the existing common
law, either by legislation or by judicial decisions. 5
at 67-108 (1977). This thesis is opposed. See Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in
Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717 (1981).
3. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 95-96 (1881).
4. Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensation Acts, 27 HARV. L. REv. 235, 368 (1914).
5. Id. at 363 (footnote omitted). There were early responses to this challenge. See
Ballantine, A Compensation Plan for Railway Accident Claims, 29 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1916);
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The trend that Jeremiah Smith so dolefully forecast has gradually,
but at an increasing pace, transformed the compensation picture in most
countries that have entered the benign climate of the "welfare" or "post-
industrial" state. Social security, another German invention, today assures
free medical care and at least subsistence benefits to all needy citizens,
including accident victims, regardless of cause or fault. Workers' com-
pensation, whether in its original structure or merged into a comprehen-
sive social security system, provides preferential benefits for job-related
injuries. Specialized plans for particular types of accidents on the workers'
compensation model are. proliferating in such areas as road traffic, air-
craft crashes, 6 victims of violent crimes, drug and vaccine, even sporting
injuries.7 Recently, the Pearson Commission, not content with proclaim-
ing that social security in Britain had already reduced tort to the role
of "junior partner," ' recommended adoption of several specialized com-
pensation plans or strict liability, with a view to eventual displacement
of all tort damages.' This ultimate objective of comprehensive and ex-
clusive no-fault accident compensation has already been blossoming in
New Zealand since 197410 and came within a hair's breadth of realization
in Australia in 1975."1 In the meantime, the law of torts is being
manipulated by compensation-minded judges and juries, looking more like
handmaidens of collectivism than the traditional guardians of liberty. Does
all of this signal the death of tort? 2
Carman, Is a Motor Vehicle Accident Compensation Act Advisable?, 4 MINN. L. REV. I
(1919).
6. Such plans now exist for passengers as well as for ground damage. The Warsaw
Convention, reprinted in N. MATTE, TREATISE ON AIR-AERONAUTICAL LAW app. 11 (1981),
and Rome Convention which were duplicated by Australian legislation for domestic as well
as international flights are examples. See J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 303-04 (6th ed.
1983); Edwards, Liability of Air Carriers, 56 AUSTL. L.J. 108 (1982).
7. See Fleming, Drug Injury Compensation Plans, 30 AM. J. ComP. L. 297, 304-05
(1982).
8. 1 PEARSON COMM'N, supra note 1, 1732.
9. The Commission's preference for such a compromise over comprehensive accident
compensation has been criticized by social security enthusiasts. See ACCIDENT COMPENSA-
TION AFTER PEARSON (D. Allen, C. Bourn & J. Holyoak eds. 1979) [hereinafter cited as
AFTER PEARSON]; Ogus, Corfield & Harris, Pearson: Principled Reform or Political Com-
promise?, 7 INDUS. L.J. 143 (1978). See generally Fleming, The Pearson Report: Its
"Strategy," 42 MOD. L. REV. 249 (1979); Marsh, The Pearson Report on Civil Liability
and Compensation for Death or Personal Injury, 95 LAW Q. REV. 513 (1979).
10. The Accident Compensation Act 1972, N.Z. Stat. No. 43. It followed the celebrated
"Woodhouse Report," see infra note 10. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY,
COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY IN NEW ZEALAND (1968). See generally A. BLAIR, AC-
CIDENT COMPENSATION IN NEW ZEALAND (1978); T. ISON, ACCIDENT COMPENSATION: A COM-
MENTARY ON THE NEW ZEALAND SCHEME (1980); G. PALMER, COMPENSATION FOR INCAPAC-
ITY (1979).
11. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY, COMPENSATION AND REHABILITA-
TION IN AUSTRALIA (1974). See generally H. LUNTZ, COMPENSATION AND REHABILITATION
(1975). The present Labour Government has intimated renewed interest in the scheme.
12. With apology to Grant Gilmore's The Death of Contract which noted the accelerating
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This diversity of solutions raises two issues to which I address my
following remarks: first, the comparative attractions and shortcomings of
the principal competitors: tort, special compensation programs, or com-
prehensive social insurance; second, whether their contemporary coexistence
is a transitory and justifiable situation-or, as Jeremiah Smith had forecast,
one that cannot last in the long run because of its incongruities.
COMPENSATION POLICIES
Scholarly views on the policies underlying tort liability inevitably reflect
social perceptions and values of their time. Just as Holmes and Salmond
drew on the philosophical perspective of an era concerned with in-
dividualistic action and responsibility, more recent writers have turned to
psychology, economics and collectivist ideals for standards of appraising
tort and alternative systems of accident compensation. The most impor-
tant objectives propounded over time have been (1) deterring socially
undesirable conduct, (2) allocating resources efficiently by holding to a
minimum the waste to society from accidents, (3) compensating deserving
victims and widely distributing losses to minimize individual catastrophe,
(4) minimizing transaction costs, and (5) fairly distributing the cost of
compensation. 'I3
While all of these objectives may seem desirable, there is no agreed
calculus for balancing them; nor is it simply a matter of ascertaining which
of the competing systems would attain the greatest number of these goals.
Some goals may seem far more important than others; e.g., compensating
the injured may or may not strike different policy-makers as worth sacrific-
ing deterrence, let alone increasing costs.
Deterrence and Punishment
Emphasis on punishment rests primarily on a moral basis, while em-
phasis on deterrence looks more to efficiency. The first seeks to inflict
pain in retribution for the wrong done to the victim; and since it is the
process of tort encroachment, the trend towards social insurance is not really contradicted
by the judicial tendency, especially in the United States, to make-over tort law in the image
of social insurance. The reason for this development is a widespread conviction among
"liberal" judges that the legislatures are too slow in increasing the benefits and coverage
of social security and social welfare.
13. It was in the light of these criteria that the important policy debate of the 1960s
over automobile no-fault compensation was conducted between Blum and Kalven, and
Calabresi. While both sides moved from individualistic positions critical of comprehensive
social security, the former ranked the tort solution at the top, while the latter ranked it
at the bottom and placed automobile compensation plans at the top. See W. BLUM & H.
KALVEN, PUBLIC LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW PROBLEM (1965); Blum & Kalven,
The Empty Cabinet of Dr. Calabresi: Auto Accidents and General Deterrence, 34 U. CHI.
L. REV. 239 (1967); Calabresi, Fault, Accidents and the Wonderful World of Blum and
Kalven, 75 YALE L.J. 216 (1965); see also P. ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE
LAW (3d ed. 1980).
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victim, not the state, who calls for the punishment in torts cases, punish-
ment and vengeance are closely related. By contrast, deterrence principally
aims at the reduction of accidents by imposing a toll on unsafe conduct.
Since unreasonable injury to person or property causes a reduction in socie-
ty's wealth, any deterrent therefor serves the purpose of economic
efficiency.
Although the twin purposes of punishment and deterrence have fur-
nished the classic rationale of tort liability, their credibility has increas-
ingly declined under the changing conditions of modern society. This, of
course, is a criticism not of these objectives themselves but rather of the
common law's failure to attain them. Perhaps the principal cause is that
the admonitory effect of an adverse judgment is today largely diffused
by liability insurance which protects the injurer from having to pay the
accident cost and instead distributes it among a large pool of premium
payers and thereby "socializes" the loss.' In many countries the victim
no longer even in form addresses his claim to the injurer but proceeds
directly against the latter's insurance carrier or compensation fund, thereby
eliminating even the symbolic tokens of individual blame.' 5
Other realities of tort litigation may undermine the vengeance objec-
tive. Thus, although the victim's psychic satisfaction in making his adver-
sary "pay" is claimed by some legal psychologists as a significant ra-
tionale of tort liability,' 6 the delays and aggravations of tort law in ac-
tion probably impose psychological hardships and anxiety on victims that
more than make up for what little satisfaction some victims receive.
Nonetheless, some of the admonitory effect of a tort award is still
retained. Insurance premiums are commonly adjusted in the light of the
insured's accident record, and fear of substantial rises and possibly even
policy cancellation arguably has some effect on individual conduct. The
broad American consensus in favor of basing premiums for both liability
and workers' compensation insurance on the insured's past accident record
14. It may strike some readers as paradoxical that socialist law is so committed to
the deterrence theory of tort that it opposes even liability insurance against negligence liability,
and thus does not even give lip service to "socializing" losses.
15. The action directe was pioneered by French Courts in a landmark decision by the
Cour de cassation. Chevassus et Cie L'Urbaine et La Seine v. Mazet, 1927 D.P. 1 57. It
has since been emulated in many countries. See, e.g., Fleming, Collateral Benefits, in II
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW-TORTS ch. 11, 76 (A. Tunc ed.
1983). It has been emulated less often in common law countries, especially jurisdictions
with jury trial. However, there are exceptions. Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla.
1969).
16. See, e.g., A. EHRENZWEIG, PSYCHOANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE §§ 205-209 (1971);
Ehrenzweig, A Psychoanalysis of Negligence, 47 Nw. U.L. Rav. 855 (1953); cf. MacCor-
mack, Revenge and Compensation in Early Law, 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 69 (1973). A recent
empirical psychological study in England is inconclusive regarding the correlation between
attributing fault and expecting the wrongdoer to make compensation. See Lloyd-Bostock,
Common Sense Morality and Accident Compensation, 1980 INS. L.J. 331.
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rests largely on this belief. However, other countries, including Great Bri-
tain, are skeptical about the effectiveness and worthwhileness of such
finesse,' 7 or, like Australian politicians, prefer flat rates for third-party
motor insurance for the sake of their imagined popular appeal.
The admonitory effect of liability probably varies with different classes
of potential defendants. Some are peculiarly sensitive to the stigma of
an adverse judgment wholly apart from any financial detriment. The most
obvious example is the medical profession, whose members dread liability
for its adverse reflection on their professional competence or integrity.
More immediate response to an adverse judgment is also likely when the
censure falls on managerial failings in industry or business rather than
on random human frailties like inattentiveness in the factory or on the
road. This results because the former are susceptible to managerial cor-
rection and monitoring, while the latter are in practice rarely amenable
to such controls. By the same token, large, stable and well-managed enter-
prises are far more likely to recognize and act on the potential variability
in insurance premiums they face than are small firms fighting for economic
survival. Indeed, because of premium-setting practices, small enterprises
might not even face the opportunity to lower insurance costs through safer
conduct.
Tort law may also play a key signalling role in stimulating the market
to work. Tort litigation in the United States has repeatedly served as "Om-
budsman," as Professor (now Justice) Linden felicitously called it,' 8 giv-
ing publicity to dangerous products (Pinto, Tampons, etc.), often with
financial consequences to the producer far more devastating in terms of
lost future sales than in damages awarded to the injured. Whether a system
of bounties for private whistle-blowers would be as or more effective is
yet untried.
Still, one must be skeptical about the effectiveness of tort law in pro-
moting accident prevention as compared with other legal or social
mechanisms. The three most important of these are government regula-
tion, criminal sanctions and ordinary economic pressures.
Regulations can play an educational role in prescribing clear procedures
designed to avoid accidents. Negligence law by contrast condemns people
after it is too late. Also, while regulatory standards are established by
experts, tort law leaves to inexpert juries or judges the bewildering task
of resolving disputes between partisan expert witnesses. While tort law
has come to take advantage of statutory standards by sometimes (though
quite erratically) treating their violation as fault without more (per se),
it is unwilling to treat compliance with prescribed standards as conclusively
17. See, e.g., Atiyah, Accident Prevention and Variable Premium Rates for Work-
Connected Accidents (pts. I & 11), 4 INDUS. L.J. 1, 89 (1975).
18. See Linden, Tort Law as Ombudsman, 51 CAN. B. REV. 155 (1973).
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exonerating. Thus, even licensing of products after a rigorous official
testing procedure, as in the case of drugs, is not accepted as necessarily
acquitting the manufacturer.' 9 An important advantage of the criminal
sanction is its concern with punishing the offender for engaging in pro-
hibited conduct; the sanction will fall on the culprit regardless of whether
he happened to victimize anyone. By contrast, misconduct, however
reprehensible, remains outside the reach of civil process so long as it does
not injure anyone, This is why motorists today fear criminal penalties
more than civil sanctions.
Even if there were no public controls and no tort law, potential in-
jurers would face other substantial pressures favoring safety. Adverse
publicity has repeatedly proved itself a potent sanction against defective
products or accident-prone activities. Recall of motor cars by the American
regulatory agency is one example. Drivers' concern for their own safety
surely counts for more than the fear of having to pay damages. Potent
deterrents compelling management to avoid work accidents are interrup-
tion of work schedules, demoralization of employees and, of course, sanc-
tions under industrial safety legislation.
In any event, the tort system's residual effects of deterrence and
punishment, such as they are, can also be enlisted by no-fault
compensation.20 While social security and general welfare systems have
a tradition of flat-rate premium rates," accident schemes do-and, in the
opinion of many observers, should-employ differential rates as reward
or rebuke of individual accident records. 2 Grave misconduct can also be
sanctioned by withholding benefits or imposing fines, or by means of in-
demnification as in the case of drunk drivers under some automobile
plans,23 but these measures could be resorted to only sparingly without
19. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT § 108
(1979) (merely raises the burden of proof), reprinted in 1 SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY
PRODUCTS LIABILITY INSTITUTE, UNIFORM PRODUCTS LIABILITY Act app. 1-1 (V. Walkowiak
ed. 1980).
20. See Brown, Deterrence and Accident Compensation Schemes, 17 U.W. ONT. L.
REV. 111 (1979); cf. Love, Punishment and Deterrence: A Comparative Study of Tort Liability
for Punitive Damages Under No-Fault Compensation Legislation, 16 U.C.D. L. REV. 231
(1983).
21. The Beveridge Committee's recommendation for differential rates on account of
abnormal risks in particular industries, REPORT OF W. BEVERIDGE, SOCIAL INSURANCE AND
ALLIED SERVICES 1 89 (reprint 1966), was not eventually accepted. Sound economics had
to yield to political considerations, resulting in a disguised subsidy of coal mining, for example.
22. All American workers' compensation and no-fault automobile insurance plans employ
differential rates. In New Zealand industry differentials have been employed from the outset
and computerization will now permit experiments with individual bonuses. However, the
road accident scheme levies a flat rate on motor vehicle owners. Professor A.R. Prest who
served on the Pearson Commission strongly advocated differential rates for work injuries
in his minority statement. 1 PEARSON COMM'N, supra note 1 940-948.
23. See, e.g., Motor Car Act 1958, VICT. STAT. No. 6325, § 59(2).
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incurring the high costs of investigation and enforcement that no-fault
programs are designed to avoid.
Efficient Loss Allocation
Advocates of individual responsibility received a timely boost of morale
from the current fad of lawyer-economists. Richard Posner, formerly a
professor with the Chicago Law School and now a federal appellate judge,
has become the principal proponent of enlisting legal policy in the service
of "free market" economics, widely known as the "Chicago school" of
thought.14 Invoking Judge Learned Hand's famous description of
negligence as conduct where the loss multiplied by its probability exceeds
the cost of avoiding it (N = L x P>C)," Posner applauds the negligence
principle as an ideal standard for promoting the most efficient allocation
of resources because its economic calculus encourages only cost-justified
precautions. In other words, the actor is penalized only for underinvest-
ment in accident prevention. 6
There are several basic problems with this thesis. Its model is the
calculating "economic man" with full information on the balance of costs.
This character will rarely be found in the "real world." But let us con-
cede that at least in the case of continuing industrial processes, such as
the mass production of cars, experience may permit reasonably reliable
forecasts of the cost of accident-preventive measures as well as of the
rate of future accidents. But how do we measure the cost of such ac-
cidents? Surely, it is a bizarre distortion of the common law to postulate
that the calculus of negligence calls for striking a purely economic balance
between benefits and losses, the losses being assessed solely in the cold-
blooded terms of the damages that would be awarded to the victim or
his survivors. While it is true that risks are sometimes worth taking and
therefore considered reasonable either because the benefits or the cost of
avoiding the risks are wholly disproportionate, the judgment is social, not
economic.
This context calls for a further elaboration. We may well assume that
the production manager of an assembly line will be guided by an economic
judgment of the cost-justified level of quality control, obedient to Coase's
famous theorem that (in a perfect market) the most efficient (wealth-
maximizing) use will prevail regardless of the initial assignment of legal
rights.27 But many, perhaps most people would be tempted to argue that
if our manager chooses to run the risk of accidents because it is cheapest,
24. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEx. L. REV. 757, 764 (1975) ("the
logic of the law is really economics").
25. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
26. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW ch. 6 (2d ed. 1977); Posner, A Theory
of Negligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972). A trenchant appraisal of Posner's and Calabresi's
theories is made by Professor Izhak Englard. See Englard, The System Builders: A Critical
Appraisal of Modern American Tort Theory, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 27 (1980).
27. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & EcON. 1 (1960).
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he should at least pay for such accidents as occur rather than, as Posner
contends, escape altogether because the risk was cost-justified and therefore
not negligent. If Posner was right, that rationale would add another plausi-
ble argument for imposing strict liability for defective products and thus
making the producer compensate the casualties of industrial efficiency.2"
Posner overplays his hand even more when parading his theory as
not merely normative but as descriptive of the actual operation of tort
law. The individual defendant is rarely, as we have seen, influenced by
Posner's recommended cost calculations; the individual plaintiff is in-
terested in compensation, not deterrence (unless the defendant is threaten-
ing a continuing tort). Moreover, the civil, unlike the criminal law does
not intervene, and therefore does not deter, unless there is damage. Posner
stands this problematic feature of tort law on its head by arguing that
in any event damages for the plaintiff are "from an economic standpoint,
[only] a detail," justified merely as an incentive for private initiative ac-
tivating efficient allocation of resources.29
A different economic argument is made in Calabresi's theory of
"general deterrence." 3 Under no illusions about tort liability's potential
for "specific deterrence," he argues from the postulate of Pigou's welfare
economics3 that all costs ought to be debited to the activity that causes
them so that they are reflected in the price of the resulting product or
activity. The cost of accidents, in short, is properly an item of the overhead
costs of a particular enterprise. In this way activities with higher accident
rates will have lesser attraction in the market place and will thus be car-
ried on to a lesser, more socially desirable extent. By contrast, it is claimed
that if activities do not bear their accident costs they are in effect sub-
sidized and will thus be overproduced. This creates both an inefficient
allocation of resources and excess accidents to boot. Thus, the market
mechanism can be enlisted in pursuit of a "general deterrence" of
accidents.
Although it has become fashionable to argue that tort law should
serve to internalize costs, there also are many problems with this line of
analysis. First, negligence law does not in fact attempt to assign all acci-
dent costs to activities that cause them. Rather, it purports to assign only
the cost of accidents that reasonably should have been avoided. To some,
28. This is not the occasion for a debate over whether even "strict" liability should
cover risks which were unknowable or unpreventable at the time of marketing the product.
Some American scholars and a few decisions have so held. An argument in its favor is
that it would encourage a higher level of investment in accident prevention than the "state
of the art" defense would.
29. See R. POSNER, supra note 26, at 143.
30. See Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE
L.J. 499 (1961). G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1970).
31. See A. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1932).
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like Calabresi, this is an indictment of negligence liability and an argu-
ment for strict liability.32 To others, it reveals a fundamental ambiguity
about the internalization argument. What is the cost of what? In many
situations policy-makers have acted as if there were no problem in at-
tributing particular accidents to a specific activity. For example, work in-
juries are by general consensus regarded as part of the cost of industrial
operations: "the cost of the product should bear the blood of the
workman."" But on closer examination, the problem can become very
thorny indeed. Is an accident caused by failure of an industrial tool to
be internalized by the maker or by the user of the tool? If mother mink
eat their young when frightened by sonic booms, is this a cost of na-
tional defense or mink farming? Is a plane crash caused by a defective
altimeter a risk attributable to manufacturing altimeters or airplanes or
to flying of, or in, airplanes?3" While it has even been argued that no
economic choice is possible between attributing a car-pedestrian accident
to either driving or walking,3" Calabresi resolves the impasse by selecting
the motorist as the "best cost avoider," having the better information
and means to reduce such accidents. 36
More important yet is that, in the real world, it is frequently im-
possible to internalize accident costs to the specific offending product or
activity. For example, not only would a drug that eventually reveals itself
as dangerous in all likelihood be totally withdrawn from the market, but
the cost of compensation will in any event probably be spread among
all or most other products of the particular manufacturer, with the result
that the consumers of the safe drugs will in effect be bearing the accident
cost of the dangerous drug. This would raise the cost of all drugs and,
following Calabresi's thesis, to that extent would deter their use, a result
that might have an adverse effect on public health.
The most problematic feature of Calabresi's, as of Posner's, approach
32. See Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to No-Fault Allocation
of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1965); Calabresi, supra n. 13.
33. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 80, at 530 (4th ed. 1971). But
as Professor Luntz has pointed out, workers' compensation, by extending coverage beyond
specific employment risks (even including in Australia, accidents to and from work), long
ceased to be justifiable on the internalization rationale. See Luntz, Workers' Compensation
and a Victorian Amendment of 1965, 40 AUSTL. L.J. 179, 189 (1966). As coverage expanded,
the scheme progressively assumed a social welfare profile, pointing in the direction of even-
tual 24-hour coverage for all employees suffering injury by accident. This trend was in ef-
fect consumated by the comprehensive accident compensation scheme in New Zealand (the
Employers' Scheme). For an American counterpart, see Henderson, Should Workmen's Com-
pensation Be Extended to Nonoccupational Injuries?, 48 TEX. L. REV. 117 (1969).
34. See Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240
N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963) (excusing the component part manufacturer but holding the aircraft
manufacturer strictly liable; dissent arguing that the airline alone should be liable).
35. See, e.g., W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, supra note 13, at 61.
36. In general, identifying the best "cost avoider" presents a tricky problem, as Calabresi
himself recognizes.
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is of course its assumption of the rationality of human behavior. Market
control is no more likely to make a substantial contribution to accident
prevention, the avowed goal of both economic theories, than is monitor-
ing cost efficiency. As Englard puts it -so well, "the tenacious attachment
to the notion of market deterrence appears to be a desperate attempt to
maintain an ideal of a free-market system in a strongly socializing world." 7
How do compensation systems measure up to Calabresi's prescrip-
tion? The more you fine-tune internalization or risk-avoidance; the more
you get away from the principle of insurance, that is, risk spreading. Strict
liability and special compensation plans, such as for road traffic victims,
function alike in focusing on one specific target, arguably so as to inter-
nalize and place the cost on the best cost-avoider (e.g., motorists as to
road traffic victims). By contrast, comprehensive accident compensation,
precisely for the sake of wide loss-distribution, sacrifices the opportunity
for such chaineling insofar as the cost incidence is undifferentiated, as
when premiums are levied on all tax-payers. 8 Even road traffic compen-
sation plans would "externalize" the cost of accidents due to equipment
failures by placing the cost on motorists rather than on manufacturers
or repairers." However, it is possible to reduce such externalizations even
within the framework of a general compensation scheme by distributing
the cost on a more differentiated basis. In New Zealand, for example,
the road traffic scheme is financed separately from the general accident
fund, and even a road traffic scheme could place separate levies on car
manufacturers were it not for the fact that the cost would ultimately also
be passed through to motorists.
Compensating Deserving Victims
Thirty years ago Glanville Williams concluded that the only defensi-
ble "aim of the law of tort" was compensation."0 Yet the law fails to
achieve that purpose. The most controversial aspect of the negligence
system is that it discriminates between different accident victims not ac-
cording to their deserts but according to the culpability of the defendant:
a claimant's success is dependent on his ability to pin responsibility for
his injury on an identifiable agent whose fault he can prove. Put dif-
ferently, negligence deems as deserving only those who can trace their
harm to someone's wrongdoing. To critics, this causes unfairly unequal
treatment in several ways: between victims of the same kind of injury,
one of whom can but another of whom cannot point to a responsible
cause; e.g., one who breaks his leg in a car accident and another who
37. Englard, supra note 26, at 49.
38. See supra text accompanying note 21.
39. That is if all tort liability for personal injury is abolished as in New Zealand. Most
such plans actually retain the manufacturer's tort liability at the suit of either the victim
or the compensation fund (subrogation).
40. See Williams, The Aims of the Law of Tort, 4 CURRENT LEGAL PROS. 137 (1951).
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slips in the bathtub;4' between one who does and one who does not suc-
ceed in proving fault in a defendant-a distinction exacerbated by the
vagaries of jury trial long after the accident in question and the fine line
that often divides minimally acceptable and culpable conduct; between
those who are personally attractive victims and those who are not-both
of which are thought by critics to influence juries unduly. Not least of
all is the fortuitous exclusion of victims unable to collect from responsi-
ble defendants who turn out to be judgment proof in that they lack liability
insurance or other financial resources to pay.
Even among those fortunate enough to obtain some damages, studies
show a capricious relation between the total amount of compensation
recovered from all sources and the gravity of the injury. 2 While slight
injuries tend to be over-compensated (because of medical insurance and
other sources of compensation which do not set off each other or reduce
tort damages and because of the nuisance value of small claims), yet the
graver the injury the smaller the share of compensation. This problem
is particularly acute in the United States because of the low liability in-
surance coverages held by many motorists and the gaps in tort recovery.
With much justification, the process has been called a "forensic lottery."4 3
By contrast, compensation plans avoid most, if not all of the preceding
inequities by focusing not on the injurer's misconduct but on the victim's
injury. Compensating the injured by "spreading the loss broadly" in-
stead of crushing the random victim has wide appeal to modern man as
a mark of compassion and social solidarity, and arguably even as an aid
for rehabilitation and thus reduction of the cost of accidents.5 The only
constraint is society's willingness and ability to bear the cost. This con-
41. Hence widely known as the "bathtub argument." Home accidents account for 50%
of all injuries, industrial accidents for 12076, road accidents for 10076, recreational and school
accidents for 8076 each. See E. BERNZWEIG, BY ACCIDENT NOT DESIGN: THE CASE FOR COM-
PREHENSIVE INJURY REPARATIONS 15 (1980). Likewise the Pearson Commission attributed
10% to road accidents, 2507o t work and the remainder elsewhere-"bathtubs." 2 PEARSON
COMM'N, supra note I, annex, tables 2, 4.
42. See Conard, The Economic Treatment of Automobile Injuries, 63 MICH. L. REV.
279, 291 (1964); U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMOBILE INJURIES
(1970).
43. See T. IsoN, THE FORENSIC LOTTERY (1967).
44. This "loss distribution" rationale goes back to the beginnings of workers' compen-
sation, was later extended to vicarious liability (Jeremiah Smith, Harold Laski, and William
0. Douglas), and eventually applied to tort generally as "enterprise liability" (Leon Green,
Albert Ehrenzweig, and Fleming James). Its most extreme reach, nominally within the
framework of tort, is reflected in decisions like Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607
P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980), which allow a plaintiff to recover from all manufac-
turers of a defective generic product without having to identify the source of the particular
product that injured him.
45. Calabresi, disdainful of moral values like the first two, (over)emphasizes the last
factor (economic) for its "secondary cost reduction."
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straint is reflected in a number of ways. In the first place, benefits are
usually less generous than the "pot of gold " promised by torts. Mostly,
they are limited to out-of-pocket loss (medical expenses and loss of earn-
ings, the latter sometimes with low ceilings). Nonpecuniary losses are usual-
ly excluded in order to spread benefits over a much wider class of
beneficiaries and in order to save high administration costs of evaluating
such losses. However, some schemes lose sight of our cultural legacy of
nonpecuniary tort damages, especially those replacing rather than com-
plementing tort liability, such as the schedule lump-sum awards for loss
of faculty under workers' compensation and somewhat similar awards
under the New Zealand comprehensive accident compensation scheme."'
Moreover, compensation systems often set ceilings on their total liability
corresponding to the maximum available insurance coverage or other limits
on funding. For example, the liability of nuclear facilities under the United
States' law is limited to $560 million; 7 that of the German drug compen-
sation scheme is limited to about $80 million (DM 200 million). 8 Com-
pensation systems thus serve to protect not only victims but also would-
be defendants from financial catastrophe. The technological advances of
our time have armed individuals with a capacity to cause almost
unimaginable losses which, under the individualistic principles of tort
damage assessment, can entail the ruin of whole industries, as illustrated
by Johns-Manville Corp. and several other asbestos producers recently
petitioning for bankruptcy in consequence of pending tort claims amount-
ing to more than their multi-billion dollar assets."9 A similar fate might
be in the offing for pharmaceutical manufacturers in the wake of DES
claims.
The second constraint affects coverage. The broadest schemes would
provide compensation for income loss regardless of cause, including ill-
ness and even unemployment. But pessimism about the political prospects
of such ambitious plans has caused most reformers to narrow their focus.
A first line of retreat is to limit compensation to the disabled, including
disability resulting from congenital defects and illness, as contemplated
in the two-stage Woodhouse proposal for Australia." More practical,
46. The same is also true under the road accident schemes of Quebec, see Baudouin,
La nouvelle legislation Qub&oise sur les accidents de la circulation, 31 R.I.D.C. 381 (1979),
and Israel. See Miller, Le droit Israelien des accidents de la circulation: Vers un syst~me
d'assurance soiiale?, 35 R.I.D.C. 51 (1983). See generally, Miller, Should Social Insurance
Pay Compensation for Pain and Suffering?, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 550 (1982). For a
discussion of the administrative difficulties with these benefits under the New Zealand scheme,
which is currently under review, see G. PALMER, supra note 10, at 224-28.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (1976). See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group,
Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (upholding 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) against a constitutional challenge).
48. See Fleming, supra note 7, at 298-301.
49. See Note, The Manville Bankruptcy: Treating Mass Tort Claims in Chapter 11 Pro-
ceedings, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1983).
50. See supra note 11; see also Ison, The Politics of Reform in Personal Injury Com-
pensation, 27 U. TORONTO L.J. (1977).
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however, is to retreat one more step and cover only accidents on the model
of tort liability, as New Zealand has done, since the ambitious but
politically most negotiable compensation plans are those limited to par-
ticular kinds of accidents, like workers' compensation, compensation for
victims of crime, and so forth.
Varying by the breadth of their coverage, accident compensation funds
raise two main problems. The first is the administrative burden of deter-
mining boundary issues. For example, has someone who bicycles into a
parked motor car suffered an injury that was "caused by or arose out
of the use . . . of a motor car"? 5 Or, looking to a more familiar situa-
tion, has a worker who suffers a heart attack incurred "personal injury
[from accident] arising out of or in the course of the employment"?"
Broad coverage of accidents in general promises the least difficulty in this
respect but by no means completely solves the problem, as the New
Zealand experience illustrates."
This administrative burden is overshadowed by a more insidious
philosophical problem. What are the credentials for preferential treatment
of these beneficiaries compared with others who fall outside the coverage
of the plan? In the case of ethical drugs, why do some plans cover only
research volunteers, while others cover vaccine victims, and yet others cover
victims of drugs in general? Why not extend compensation to all dangerous
products, rather than only to drugs? Why were the thalidomide children
more deserving of public generosity in Britain than the 1,000 other hand-
icapped children born every week or the 100,000 severely handicapped
children under sixteen who must be content with general social security
benefits?" One way out of this dilemma is to argue that a proposed change
is a politically ripe part of an evolving pattern that over the long haul
is headed toward consistency. In short, when public and official attention
is focused on a specific class of injuries, the opportunity for reform should
be grasped, even if it is only part of the package ultimately desired. This
51. See Lamont v. Motor Accidents Board, [1983] Vict. R. 88, 91 (quoting the Motor
Accident Act 1973, No. 8429, § 13(2)(A)). For a collection of Australian case law on the
comparable formula in liability insurance policies, see M. BRITTS, THIRD PARTY INSURANCE
IN AUSTRALIA (1973); for American case law, see Annot., 15 A.L.R.4th 10 (1982).
52. Luntz, supra note 33, at 179. On the history and meaning of this formula, see
id.; A. OGus & E. BARENDT, THE LAW OF SOCIAL SECURITY 272-97 (1978); 1 E. SYKES
& D. YEBURY, LABOUR LAW IN AUSTRALIA 1320-1343 (1980).
53. The New Zealand statute specifically excludes heart attacks and strokes unless shown
to be the consequence of personal injury by accident or of some effort or stress in the
course of employment that was abnormal, excessive or unusual. See A. v. Accident Com-
pensation Comm'n, [1978] 2 N.Z. Awards 25 (N.Z. Ct. Arb.). Troublesome questions have
arisen over "medical misadventure." See, e.g., Accident Compensation Comm'n v. Auckland
Hosp. Bd., [19801 2 N.Z.L.R. 748 (N.Z.H.C.) (unsuccessful sterilization).
54. See Dworkin, Pearson: Implications for Severely-Handicapped Children and Prod-
ucts Liability, in AFTER PEARSON, supra note 9 at 160, 165.
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seems to have been the lodestar of the Pearson Commission in England"
and of the Law Reform Commission in New South Wales. 6 On the other
hand, there are those who strenuously criticize special plans, not only for
the horizontal inequity they entail, but for diverting efforts from enact-
ing a system of comprehensive social insurance.
7
Minimizing Transaction Costs
The most formidable criticism that can be levied against the tort system
is its inordinate expense. Two recent sets of figures tell the story. The
Pearson Commission estimated that in England it cost eighty-five cents
to deliver one dollar in net benefits to the victim." Studies in the United
States upped operating costs to one dollar and seven cents for automobile
accidents" and one dollar and twenty-five cents for products liability.
60
These staggering transaction costs of the tort system compare most un-
favorably with the cost of compensation plans. In New Zealand ad-
ministrative costs are under ten percent,6 ' and a similar experience is
claimed for Ontario workers' compensation.62 In New Zealand the sav-
ings from lower transaction costs account far more than somewhat lower
benefits for the ability to provide compensation for all accident victims
for the same price ticket.63
The high transaction costs of the tort system are inherent in the system
itself. The primary cause is the adversary relationship between claimant
and the compensation source. Compensation is dependent on issues of
causation and fault, which require investigation and are frequently con-
tested. The assessment of damages, tailored to each case, invites addi-
55. See 1 PEARSON COMM'N supra note 9, 11 272-325. Even the New Zealand develop-
ment, see supra note 10, was progressive, since the scheme as originally enacted in 1972
excluded non-earners except with respect to motor accidents. The exclusion was eliminated
in 1974, the cost being borne by a supplementary fund-in 1978-1979, 13076 of total claims
and 11.2% of total costs were attributable to this category.
56. ACCIDENT COMPENSATION WORKING PAPER 1: A TRANSPORT ACCIDENTS SCHEME FOR
NEW SOUTH WALES (May 1983).
57. See supra note 9.
58. 1 PEARSON COMM'N, supra note 1, 261. Otherwise expressed, operating costs
amounted to 4507o of the premium dollar. The Minogue Report estimated that legal ex-
penses in Victoria "can exceed 200 of the total payouts." MINOGUE REP. para. 8.15 (1978).
59. J. VOLPE, MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES AND THEIR COMPENSATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 47-52 (U.S. Dep't of Transp. 1971).
60. U.S. DEP'T OF COM., INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY: FINAL
REPORT V-23 to V-25 (1978).
61. In 1982 they were 9.550o of income. See REPORTS OF THE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION
COMM'N TO PARLIAMENT, cited by Hodge, No-Fault in New Zealand: It Works, 50 INS.
CoUNs. J. 222, 230 (1983).
62. Cost of compensation plans put at 9%. See P. WEILER, RESHAPING WORKERS' COM-
PENSATION IN ONTARIO 20 (1980).
63. The average levy for employers is now only 1.07% of wages, which is 1/3 of the
average premium rate paid by employers in New South Wales for workers' compensation
and common law liability.
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tional controversy. In sum, the system is geared to individualized proc-
essing and does not favor economies of scale. Finally, these costs are in-
curred in the processing of all claims, not only those that are eventually
successful. 6
Thus, critics reserve their strongest condemnation for the tort system's
misallocation of resources, arguing that no countervailing benefits could
come anywhere close to justifying these transaction costs which flow into
the pockets of the insurance industry and the legal profession instead of
benefiting the injured. Significantly, most tort apologists confine themselves
to arguments over deterrence and fairness in who should pay, but turn
away from the critical issue of whether any imagined superiority over com-
pensation is not bought at too high a price.63
The least transaction costs are of course incurred by letting the loss
lie where it falls. In "bargaining situations ' 6  like those between buyer
and seller or doctor and patient, the option of. the potential victim assum-
ing the risk without recourse is not implausible. In a perfect market it
would cost the victim no more than its mirror image, absolute liability.
Whether it is efficient in terms of "general deterrence" would depend
on who of the two parties is the best "cost avoider." This party will,
however, usually be the supplier of the goods or services who has better
access to information about the risks and the means to reduce them. This
approach is broadly reflected by contemporary law. Historically, the com-
mon law has been tolerant of exemption clauses, whereby the potential
victim assumes the legal as well as the physical risk of injury, at least
in the absence of overreaching or gross bargaining inequality. In recent
years, however, legislation has intervened more paternalistically either by
vitiating such bargains completely, as in the case of consumer products, 67
or by subjecting to judicial monitoring "unreasonable" 8 or
"unconscionable ' 69 disclaimers. The solution of letting the victim bear
the loss is obviously least attractive when the parties are unrelated as in
the case of motorist and pedestrian and the opportunities for bargaining
are nonexistent.7" Moreover, under modern conditions, individuals (as
64. Thus, the reluctance of the drug companies and their insurers to participate in the
1976 swine flu program in the United States stemmed less from their fear of successful
claims than from concern over the cost of handling claims, spurious no less than meritorious.
In the upshot, the government had to agree that rather than indemnify the manufacturers
against successful claims, it would handle (defend) all claims directly with a mere right of
reimbursement from negligent manufacturers. 42 U.S.C. § 247b(j), (k) (1976). See R.
NEUSTADT & H. FINEBERG, THE SWINE FLU AFFAIR 52-53 (1978).
65. See, e.g., Blum & Kalven, supra note 13.
66. Calabresi, supra note 13, at 224.
67. See, e.g., Australia's Trade Practices Act 1974, § 68; England's Supply of Goods
(Implied Terms) Act 1973, and Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977; U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1977).
68. England's Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (in relation to "business activities").
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1979); U.C.C. § 2-302 (1977).
70. Coase's "ingenious" attempt to resolve even such situations in bargaining terms
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distinct from commercial enterprises) have only limited opportunities for
efficient first-party or self-insurance, besides being generally risk-averse.
Fairly Distributing Costs
Fair allocation of the cost of accidents (the "justice factor") is at
the core of the fault theory of torts. Damages are awarded not on the
basis of the plaintiff's merits but on the basis of the defendant's demerits,
the rationale being that only fault justifies imposing the loss on a defen-
dant. Opposition to no-fault is based principally on two grounds. First,
such liability is considered unfairly onerous; second, it tends to discourage
enterprise. These suppositions were truer when Holmes and Salmond wrote
than they are today. Liability insurance has done for defendants what
damages and first-party insurance do for victims: it deflects the catastrophic
impact of the loss from a single individual by spreading it among a larger
segment of the population. By thus collectivizing the loss, the individualistic
rationale of traditional tort law has largely eroded.
A realistic view of the distribution of losses in modern society also
suggests that in many situations" the cost of accidents,72 if originally im-
posed on the tort defendant, will in fact be passed on to his customers
in the form of higher prices for his goods or services, thus assuring a
further spreading in addition to that accomplished by liability insurance.
Thus the beneficiaries of the dangerous activity will eventually be footing
the bill." In some situations, it will be the class of potential victims, like
consumers of defective products, airline passengers, and so forth. This
may explain the greater appeal of strict liability or no-fault compensation
in the latter instances, since they operate in effect as a form of com-
pulsory self-insurance. Less enthusiastic are "free-marketeers" concerned
with offering a consumer choice, especially to risk-takers.
In summary, the actual operation of the tort system today rarely fits
the classic model of individual loss-bearing but rather results in collec-
tivization of losses much as under compensation plans. This effect largely
undermines the argument that it is unfair to allocate costs to the non-
negligent. Indeed, modern opponents of compensation plans tend to dwell
more on the supposed accident-deterrent effect of the negligence doctrine
than on its comparative fairness. Such criticism as exists on that score
is more likely directed at aspects of cost-allocation involving externaliza-
has been rightly rejected. See Blum & Kalven, supra note 13; Calabresi, supra note 13,
at.231; see also S. REA, DISABILITY INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY (1981) (advocates in
general private disability insurance in preference to mandatory schemes from the point of
view of economic theory but unrelated to practical realities).
71. These situations do not include private motorists whose stake in automobile com-
pensation plans is therefore much greater than that of commercial enterprises.
72. The costs of liability insurance being included.
73. This insight has become common coin in modern tort literature. See, e.g., P. ATIYAH,
supra note 13; J. FLEMING, supra note 6, at 8-11.
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tions, such as not taxing pedestrians and car manufacturers under road
accident plans7 4-externalizations which tend to increase the broader the
coverage of the plan.
COEXISTENCE OF TORT AND COMPENSATION
Any merit-grading between the several methods of accident compen-
sation so far considered should allow for the additional possibility of coex-
istence between tort and no-fault compensation. Indeed, this is precisely
our contemporary situation in which social security provides a minimum
welfare net for all disabled regardless of cause, and special schemes like
workers' compensation offer more generous benefits for certain accident
victims without excluding tort recourse.
Such a mixed system can take one of two forms, one vertical, and
the other horizontal. The compensation plan might replace tort liability
completely for a particular type of accident-a solution in many coun-
tries for work injuries-leaving tort liability intact for other accidents.
Alternatively, and more commonly, the tort remedy serves a complemen-
tary function, promising additional benefits over and above those of the
basic plan. Both methods can serve as stepping stones towards an even-
tual complete displacement of tort. The Pearson Commission's declared
long-term objective envisaged a progressive piecemeal accumulation of com-
pensation plans (including strict liability) which would eventually cover
all victims, perhaps in the form of a single comprehensive compensation
plan.75 A second strategy, far advanced in Sweden,76 is to squeeze tort
liability by augmenting already high social security benefits with first-party
insurance.
Notwithstanding Jeremiah Smith's prognosis," the two-tier system also
has its proponents as a definitive rather than an interim solution. Ex-
amples include many of the contemporary road accident compensation
plans" which set limited maxima for no-fault benefits but allow recourse
74. See, e.g., Blum & Kalven, Ceilings, Costs, and Compulsion in Auto. Compensa-
tion Legislation, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 341.
75. See I PEARSON COMM'N, supra note I, 272-325. Even the New Zealand develop-
ment, see supra note 10, was progressive, since the scheme as originally enacted in 1972
excluded non-earners except with respect to motor accidents. The exclusion was eliminated
in 1974, the cost being borne by a supplementary fund-in 1973-1979, 1376 of total claims
and 11.20o of total costs were attributable to this category.
76. See Fleming, supra note 7, at 301-03, and references cited therein.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 4-5.
78. This includes the Victorian and South Australian and all American no-fault schemes.
By contrast, Quebec and Israel have abolished all tort liability for road accidents, and so
would the New South Wales Law Commission. See supra note 56. The Minogue Report
in Victoria also favored in principle abolition of tort, but concluded that it was sufficient
at present to extend the existing no-fault plan by providing benefits of 8507o of pre-accident
earnings until the age of retirement. For Quebec's approach, see Baudouin, supra note 46;
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to tort for additional or alternative damages. The real motivation behind
that strategy is not ideological but practical; that is, to assuage the op-
position of the legal profession, while bringing under compensation the
largest number of claims (which are small) and reducing their dispropor-
tionately high handling costs, without incurring the very substantial extra
cost of the relatively few catastrophic cases.79 This posture is open to
criticism for denying compensation to those claimants who are least well
served by the tort system and therefore in greatest need of prompt and
adequate support." But some tort apologists defend this arrangement as
an acceptable compromise that would tolerate minimum no-fault com-
pensation as a welfare measure but leave additional recovery contingent
on proof of fault.8 '
CONCLUSION
As mentioned at the outset, there is no objective calculus for deciding
which of the three basic methods of dealing with the accident problem-
tort, special, or comprehensive compensation-best meets the several goals
we have considered. The reason is that both the degree to which each
method meets these goals as well as the relative order of priority among
them are debatable. Moreover, even a principled choice along these lines
must confront practical realities, like power relations at the legislative level
and the resistance of vested interests, not the least of which is that of
the legal profession. 2 Still, if, as I predict, the law of tort will yield more
and more ground to accident compensation in coming years, tort practi-
tioners may yet take heart in the prospect of making up lost ground in
for Israel's approach, see Miller, supra note 46, at 565. See generally Tunc, Traffic Acci-
dent Compensation: Law and Proposals, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE
LAW-TORTS ch. 14 (A. Tunc ed. 1983).
79. On the basis of costs prevailing in the late 1960s, 90% of all persons suffering
personal injuries in automobile accidents in the U.S. sustained economic losses not exceeding
$1,000, and 97% did not exceed $5,000, but the 1% with losses of $10,000 or more absorbed
9% of the total aggregate. Source: U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF
AUTOMOBILE INJURIES (1970).
80. In the United States, under-compensation of accidents is aggravated by the low
limits of automobile liability insurance, and by over-compensation of trivial accidents by
the "collateral source" rule. See Conard, supra note 42. On the other hand, to the extent
that these high losses are attributable to exceptionally high income, for example, of profes-
sional athletes and artists, their claim for inclusion is weak, since the risk would be sub-
sidized by the poor. Limitation of benefits to average earnings rather than to aggregate
maxima would meet this problem.
81. Most notable are Blum and Kalven, supra note 13, arguing that such a mix retains
a measure of "corrective justice" in addition to the welfare function, and treats all tort
victims alike by not depriving serious automobile victims of the "excess." Both arguments,
especially the second, were also invoked by the Pearson Commission. I PEARSON COMM'N,
supra note 1, 272-325.
82. See Ison, supra note 50.
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expanding areas of economic losses and in the civilized mission of fur-
thering civil rights, privacy, and other personality interests. 3
83. Cf. Pedrick, Does Tort Law Have a Future?, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 782 (1978). Pedrick
predicts a rosy future for "relational torts" (a Leon Green composium) for "assorted harms
to personal dignity, to financial interests, to interests in relationships with the changing
family, groups, traders, the community, the political system and a variety of now unimagined
claims to protect the quality and opportunities of life for the individual citizen." Id. at 790.
